himself intended to impose it, or to threaten with censure and punishment for leaving it. People have differed over the proper formulation of the rule: should one say, “Whatever an obligation cannot be completed without is itself obligatory—whether its obligatoriness is established by Scripture or by reason,” or must one add the proviso, “provided it lies within the legally accountable person’s power”? The majority adopt the first, unrestricted wording, whereas some later scholars tied it to the condition of ability; yet no such restriction is needed. When something is beyond a person’s capacity, the duty lapses with that incapacity; ability is therefore a condition for the obligation’s very existence, not for the performance of the act once due. Hence the majority declare: “Whatever an obligation cannot be completed without is obligatory.” The point here is that whenever Allah makes something incumbent upon His servants, and discharging that duty requires learning some branch of knowledge, then acquiring that knowledge becomes obligatory. Thus, if a servant’s knowledge of what Allah has commanded hinges on understanding words uttered in a language other than his own, and he is able either to learn the meaning of those foreign terms or to obtain their translation into his own tongue, he is obliged to do so. Suppose a letter were sent from one king to another in a language the recipient did not speak; the latter would immediately seek someone to translate the sender’s intent, and it would not be acceptable for him to protest, “You did not send anyone to address me in my own language,” while he is perfectly able to grasp the meaning through translation. How, then, could such an objection be raised against the Lord of the worlds! Likewise, if a king were to command some of his subjects or soldiers in his own language, and they were capable of understanding his order either by learning that language or by