—indeed, what greater distinction is there among rational people than their ability to tell one from the other? Moreover, human beings as a species are drawn to those who possess noble qualities and shy away from those who display disgraceful ones: the former they love to hear and behold, while from the latter they recoil, unwilling even to look at him or listen to his speech.
Type Five:
Demonstrating that these well-known maxims are grasped by innate disposition
Type Five (detail):
The first premises of these propositions are self-evident within every soul, for it is fashioned to love whatever accords with it and to loathe whatever harms it. By “good” we mean that which accords with and benefits it; by “evil” we mean that which harms and injures it. Since the soul is innately inclined to love the one and hate the other, our saying that a thing is good simply means that it is suitable and beneficial, and our saying that it is evil means that it is harmful and hurtful. This is something instilled by fiṭrah (innate nature); therefore people, by their inborn disposition, know these common judgments among them.
Type Six:
Showing that the cause obligating belief in these well-known maxims is inseparable from human nature
Type Six (detail):
Were these propositions to have no starting-point within the human faculties, they would never have become famous among all nations. Whatever is universally acknowledged must rest on a cause found in the shared fiṭrah of every nation. Hence the cause that compels people to believe these maxims is something in which all nations participate, and that can only be an inseparable attribute of humanity itself, for the nations do not universally share in anything other than the concomitants of being human.
Type Seven:
Ibn Sīnā’s self-refutation of his claim that the well-known maxims are not apprehended by the faculties of the soul
Type Seven (detail):
He says: “If a person were to imagine himself created all at once, fully rational, having heard no instruction and experienced no psychological impulse or moral training, he would form no judgment about others like him.”
This is untenable. If he truly possessed a sound intellect he would know that knowledge, justice, and truthfulness benefit him, set his soul aright, and bring it delight, whereas lying and injustice harm him, corrupt his soul, and cause it pain—even if we were to suppose that no one besides himself were aware of it.
العقلاء إلا بمعرفة هذا من هذا بل وجنس الناس يميل إلى من يتصف بالصفات الجميلة وينفر عمن يتصف بالقبائح فذاك يميل جنس الإنسان إلى سمع كلامه ورؤيته وهذا ينفر عن رؤيته وسمع كلامه.
النوع الخامس:
في بيان كون هذه المشهورات معلومة بالفطرة
النوع الخامس:
أن مبادىء هذه القضايا أمر ضروري في النفوس فإنها مفطورة على حب ما يلائمها وبغض ما يضرها والمراد بالحسن ما يلائمها وبالقبيح ما يضرها وإذا كانت مفطورة على حب هذا وبغض هذا فالمراد بقولنا حسن أنه ملائم نافع والمراد بقولنا قبيح أنه ضار مؤذ وهذا أمر فطري فعلم أن الناس بفطرتهم يعلمون هذه القضايا المشهورة بينهم.
النوع السادس:
في بيان كون الموجب لاعتقاد هذه المشهورات من لوازم الإنسانية
النوع السادس:
أن يقال: لو لم يكن لهذه القضايا مبدأ في قوى الإنسان لم تشتهر في جميع الأمم فان المشهور في جميع الأمم لا بد أن يكون له موجب في الفطرة المشتركة بين جميع الأمم فعلم أن الموجب لاعتقاد هذه القضايا أمر اشتركت فيه الأمم وذلك لا يكون إلا من لوازم الإنسانية فان الأمم لم تشترك كلها في غير لوازم الإنسانية.
النوع السابع:
رد ابن سينا على نفسه في قوله بأن المشهورات لا تدرك بقوى النفس
النوع السابع:
قوله:
"لو توهم الإنسان بنفسه أنه خلق دفعة تام العقل ولم يسمع أدبا ولم يطع انفعالا نفسانيا ولا خلقا لم يقض في أمثاله بشيء"
هذا ممنوع بل أن كان تام العقل علم أن العلم والعدل والصدق ينفعه وتصلح به نفسه وتلتذ وأن الكذب والظلم يضره ويفسد نفسه ويؤلمها ولو قدر أنه لا يعلم به أحد غير