Intuitive propositions (ḥadsiyyāt) are obtained in the same way: one first perceives their particular instances through the senses; when those instances recur, the intellect grasps the common universal element. In this case, however, the recurrence is not the result of human action but is exemplified by celestial phenomena. A person observes, for example, that the moon’s brightness varies with its changing angle of opposition to the sun and therefore infers that its light is borrowed from the sun. He notices as well that the fixed stars show no difference in their motion, whether in longitude or in latitude, but move with a single uniform motion; from this he infers that they share one sphere, for otherwise each star might have its own sphere whose motion merely resembled the others. Likewise, when he observes the differing motions of the seven planets, he infers the diversity of their spheres. Logicians call this kind of knowledge “experientials” (tajribiyyāt); many of them, in fact, give it no other name and recognize no separate category besides the experiential propositions. In short, any matter governed by habit—whether the habit arises from volitional intention or from a natural power—comes to be known as a universal either through experience or through intuition, if intuition is treated as a distinct type. Even our grasp of the meanings of words belongs to the intuitive class. A listener hears a speaker utter a word and may discern the specific meaning intended by means of a gesture or some other contextual clue. When the speaker then repeats that word time after time, always intending the same meaning, the listener realizes that this is the speaker’s deliberate habit—that, whenever he wishes to convey something, he chooses that word for that meaning. This is what is called an intuitive proposition, because the speaker’s utterance does not depend on the listener’s choice. Yet it also falls under general experiential knowledge, for hearing itself conveys only the sound, while the particular meaning may at first be grasped by several means. Knowing, however, that it is the speaker’s customary usage to intend that meaning whenever he utters that word belongs to this same domain. The same applies to everything we learn about the habits of human beings, animals, plants, and all other entities. One person can likewise discover the habit of his counterpart. If it is someone’s custom that, whenever he says or does something, he means a certain purpose, then when one sees another person—his counterpart—uttering that same phrase or performing that same act, one assumes that the latter intends what the former intended. The habit, after all, is understood to belong to the species, not merely to the individual, just as people’s shared conventions in speech and deed are understood.