outside the scope of the permissibility I have endorsed. It is therefore evident that anyone who says of me, “His legal verdict contradicts his piety,” is very far indeed from sound understanding—or from justice.

Second: Alongside my affirmation that the face is not ʿawrah, I have also declared that covering it is preferable. On ⦗104⦘ I refuted, with hadiths and early reports, those who claim that covering is an innovation and a form of religious extremism, and I concluded both discussions with the following words ⦗114⦘:

“It follows from what we have set forth that a woman’s covering of her face with a burqa (face veil) or the like—such as is common today among chaste women—is a legitimate and praiseworthy act. It is not, however, obligatory; whoever does so has acted well, and whoever does not incurs no blame.”

This is an explicit statement from me preferring the option of covering, and it is a rebuttal to both hard-line camps: those who insist on its obligatory nature and those who brand it an innovation—“The best of matters are those that tread the middle course.”1

The plain reality, as I see it, is that although my heart is nearly torn apart with grief and sorrow over the disgraceful unveiling and shameless display into which the women of our age have plunged like moths toward a flame, I do not for a moment believe that the remedy lies in forbidding what Allah has permitted them—namely, the uncovering of the face—or in imposing its covering upon them without a command from Allah or His Messenger. Rather, the wisdom of the Sacred Law, its gradual method, and some of its foundational principles