All of this holds only when the outward practice in question is, in itself, purely permissible once any resemblance to them is removed. Should that practice, however, be one of the very things that constitute their unbelief, then it becomes a branch of unbelief; to imitate them in it is to share in one of their acts of disobedience. This is a foundational point that must be kept firmly in mind.

He had already written at the beginning of the book ⦗7–8⦘:

“There is a subtle point here. A command to conform to a people—or to differ from them—may be issued because the very intention to conform, or the conformity itself, is beneficial; and likewise the very intention to differ, or the act of differing, is beneficial. In other words, the deed in question may carry benefit or harm for the servant, even though, if it were stripped of the element of conformity or dissent, that same deed would contain neither benefit nor harm.

“For that reason we profit simply from following the Messenger of Allah ﷺ and the earliest generations in certain actions which, had they not performed them, might well have held no benefit for us; for such following nurtures our love for them, unites our hearts with theirs, and moves us to emulate them in other matters—among many further advantages. By the same token, we may be harmed by imitating the unbelievers in deeds which, had they not been doing them, would not have harmed us.

“Sometimes the order to conform or to differ is given because the deed itself embodies benefit or harm even if they had never done it; yet the instruction is couched in terms of ‘conforming’ and ‘differing’ merely to point this out and make it clear. Thus, their conformity serves as an indicator of harm, while differing from them points to benefit. Considering conformity and dissent in this way belongs to analogy by indication, whereas the earlier case belongs to analogy by effective cause—and the two rationales may well coincide. I mean…”