2- It also shows that, in judicial matters, the same procedural limits apply to the Prophet ﷺ as to other judges: he rules according to what is outwardly apparent, while Allah alone knows the hidden realities. Thus he decides on the basis of evidence, oaths, and similar outward proofs, even though the inward truth may be different.
3- He was commanded to judge by what is manifest, even though Allah could have disclosed the unseen to him so that he might rule with the certainty of his own personal knowledge, without recourse to proof or oath. This was in order that his practice serve as precedent and legislation for his community.
4- The ḥadīth offers consolation and encouragement to judges: if the Prophet ﷺ might, because of the eloquence of one litigant, assume something incorrect and rule in his favour, then other judges are even more likely to do so.
5- The scholars of legal theory agree unanimously that the Prophet ﷺ is never left in error with respect to judicial rulings. How, then, is this consensus to be reconciled with the present ḥadīth? Al-Nawawī answered that there is no conflict, for the consensus concerns verdicts he reached through ijtihād (independent reasoning). The ḥadīth, however, speaks of a judgment based not on ijtihād but on outward proof such as testimony. If such a verdict happens to differ from the inward truth, it is not deemed an error; rather, it is a valid ruling founded on the established obligation to act on the evidence of, say, two witnesses. Should those witnesses be false, the fault lies with them. This differs from a mistaken ijtihād, for in that case the ruling he issued would not constitute the Sharīʿah judgment.
6- A judge’s ruling does not alter the inward reality nor render the unlawful lawful. This is the position of the overwhelming majority of Muslim scholars and the jurists of the various cities, including the three Imāms: Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, and Aḥmad. Accordingly, if a judge pronounces a woman to be a man’s wife while the man knows she is not, she does not become lawful for him; or if he awards him property that he knows he is wrongly claiming, it remains unlawful for him, and so on.
7- The restriction in the ḥadīth to “a Muslim” is only because that is the prevalent case; the same principle applies to a dhimmī or a treaty-holder.
8- The phrase “let him take it or leave it” contains a stern threat and emphatic warning to anyone who seizes people’s wealth through false claims and illicit stratagems. The wording resembles Allah’s statement, “Do whatever you wish” (Q 41:40).
9- Shaykh al-Islām observed that when the Companions spoke from their own reasoning, they carefully absolved the Prophet’s law of any error on their part or on anyone else’s. Ibn Masʿūd, for example, said regarding the case of the bride with an unspecified dowry: “I speak on this matter according to my opinion; if it is correct, then it is from Allah, and if it is mistaken, it is from me and from Satan, and Allah and His Messenger are free of it.” Similar statements are related from Abū Bakr concerning the inheritance of kalālah, and from ʿUmar as well.