and Ishaq.
Their evidence is the report narrated by Abu Dawud from Ibn ʿAbbas in which the Prophet said, “The previously-married woman has more right over herself than her guardian, and the virgin must be asked for permission; her silence is her consent.” (1) Since he divided women into two categories and affirmed the right for one of them, that implicitly negates it for the other—the virgin—so her guardian’s right overrides hers.
A second narration from Imam Ahmad states that the father has no authority to compel her, and this is the position of Imam Abu Hanifah, al-Awzaʿi, al-Thawri, and Abu Thawr.
This narration was preferred among the Ḥanbali scholars by Abu Bakr, Shaykh Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn al-Qayyim, the author of al-Fāʾiq, and our teacher ʿAbd al-Rahman Al-Saʿdi. Shaykh ʿAbd Allah Aba Butayn, the Mufti of Najd in his time, likewise inclined to it.
The proof for this view is the very hadith under discussion, for the Prophet forbade marrying her off without her permission; had that permission carried no legal weight, he would not have made it the decisive condition for concluding the marriage.
Additional support comes from the report of Abu Dawud and Ibn Majah from Ibn ʿAbbas: A young virgin came to the Prophet and complained that her father had married her off while she was unwilling, so the Prophet gave her the choice. He also said, “The virgin is asked for her consent.”
Thus, the hadith of this chapter contains a prohibition; the hadith of the girl establishes her option; and the third hadith commands that her permission be sought—and a command indicates obligation.
This opinion is the one demanded by the wise and just principles of the Sharia.
If her father is not allowed to dispose of even a small part of her property without her approval, how could he force her to surrender her very person and to live in intimacy with someone she dislikes and does not wish to remain with?
Compelling her to marry a man she loathes is a dark imprisonment of her soul, her heart, her body, and her mind.
Endorsing such coercion contradicts both justice and wisdom.
What difference is there between her and the previously-married woman whose right in this matter everyone acknowledges?
To distinguish between them is to differentiate between two identical cases, something rejected by sound analogy.
As for the evidence cited for the first opinion—namely the phrase, “The previously-married woman has more right over herself than her guardian”—it is an inferred meaning; and even if inferred meanings were accepted as proof, an explicit text takes precedence over them.