Among these proofs is his, peace and blessings be upon him, saying: “The Muslims are bound by their stipulations, except a stipulation that makes the unlawful lawful or the lawful unlawful.” The conditions under discussion do neither.
Another proof is his statement, peace and blessings be upon him, that he “forbade the thunyā unless its extent is specified.” Here the stipulations and exclusions are precisely defined; therefore they do not fall under that prohibition.
A further proof is the ḥadith of Jābir now before us, for he stipulated to the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, that he be allowed to ride the camel’s back until they reached Madinah. None of the recognised prohibitions—usury (ribā), excessive uncertainty (gharar), harm (ḍarar), or injustice (ẓulm)—is present in these conditions. How, then, could they be forbidden when the default rule in commercial dealings is permissibility and latitude? And just as there is no inherent corruption in them, they are not a means to any corruption either.
We reply to the proofs of those who invalidate a sale accompanied by a condition as follows: the ḥadith, “The Prophet forbade the thunyā unless its extent is specified,” by its very implication, stands as one of our own evidences and thus refutes their view. As for the report, “He forbade a sale together with a stipulation,” it is not authentic; the sound wording is only, “Two stipulations in one sale are not lawful.”
Disagreement among the scholars:
The scholars have differed over the meaning of those two stipulations. The best explanation is that they refer to the ʿīnah arrangement, in which a person says, “Take this commodity from me for ten in cash, and I will buy it back from you for twenty on credit.”
This interpretation matches the import of the ḥadith exactly and is parallel to the expression “two sales in one sale,” about which the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said: “Whoever conducts two sales in one sale may take the lower of the two prices, otherwise he is engaged in usury.” That statement, too, has been explained as referring to the ʿīnah sale. No other explanation fits the ḥadith concerning “two stipulations in one sale.” The two conditions meant are: first, the contract itself, for both parties pledge to fulfil it; and second, the accompanying provision that the contract be repeated a second time for a price higher than the first.
As for the ḥadith of Jābir, the claim that the Prophet intended a gift rather than a true sale cannot stand. Even if we were to suppose that the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, did not actually mean a sale, this was certainly unknown to Jābir, who initiated the stipulation about riding the camel. Thus, the permissibility of such a condition was evidently recognised among them.
Moreover, the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, approved his stipulation, and he does not approve anything false—whether in earnest or in jest. Regarding the objection that the narrators differ in the wording of the report, the eminent scholar Ibn Daqīq al-ʿĪd replied: “That is true, but only when the various narrations are of equal or nearly equal strength. If some are demonstrably stronger—because their transmitters are more numerous and more reliable—one must act upon the stronger version; the weaker report cannot prevent acting upon the stronger, and the less preferred narration does not invalidate reliance on the preferred. Adhere to this principle, for it is beneficial in many areas.” End of citation.