Chapter: Creatures Whose Killing Is Permissible
This section clarifies what may be put to death after the previous discussion on the prohibition of killing and the discouragement of hunting. It therefore serves either as an exception to what preceded or as a rebuttal of anything one might wrongly assume to be included.
First ḥadith
On the authority of ʿĀʾishah—may Allah be pleased with her—the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said:
“Five kinds of beasts are all fāsiq (vicious) and may be killed within the Sanctuary: 1. the crow, 2. the kite, 3. the scorpion, 4. the rat, and 5. the vicious dog.”
Muslim adds: “Five harmful creatures may be killed both inside the ḥill and within the ḥaram (1).”
General meaning
Some animals are harmful by nature; such creatures may be killed whether one is in the ḥill (non-sacred territory), in the ḥaram (the Sacred Precinct), or even while in a state of iḥrām. Among them are these five noxious creatures, by which the Lawgiver pointed to their counterparts among other fawāsiq (vicious animals): the crow, which ruins fruit; the kite, which snatches garments and jewellery; the scorpion, which stings; the rat, which gnaws and causes destruction; and the vicious dog, which attacks people.
These five types of animals have been described as fāsiq because, by their very nature, they deviate from the rest of the animal world through aggression and harm. They were named individually because the ways in which they cause damage differ, and anything that resembles them in this viciousness among other animals is treated the same: it may be killed because of its harm and aggression. Neither the Sanctuary grants it protection, nor does the state of iḥrām give it immunity.
Scholarly disagreement
The jurists differed as to whether the permission to kill extends beyond these specified animals to others. Abū Ḥanīfah held that the ruling is confined to these alone, since it is linked to their personal names, and—according to the majority of uṣūl scholars—a proper name does not entail an implied meaning that can be carried over by analogy. The majority, however, maintained that the ruling does apply to other animals as well, yet they disagreed over the specific rationale on account of which the ruling should be extended to