—particularly in matters of orthography as we now know it from him.

Any addition that appears in brackets [ ] within the source citations or the commentary is something we ourselves have added to the archetype and pointed out—unless there is clear evidence that, on occasion, it was the Shaykh’s own supplemental note on someone else’s statement.

As for whatever comments or corrections we were obliged to insert, these are marked with an asterisk (*) to distinguish them from the Shaykh’s notes, which are identified by the sequential numerals (1), (2), and so forth.

All the while, we kept firmly in mind the resolve not to multiply annotations and interventions except where necessity compelled us. Let it be reiterated here that critical editing and extensive commentary were never part of our mandate in preparing this work for print.

Nevertheless, we were forced into a small measure of such work—something we regarded as minor, though Allah, exalted is He, decreed therein a subtle wisdom…

For this book, while it is a scholarly hadith study, is also a juristic treatise devoted to a magnificent act of worship—the prayer, a pillar of Islam embodied in his ﷺ own prayer. Consequently, it was imperative to ascertain the latest conclusions the Shaykh had reached in this field, bearing in mind the many years that have elapsed since he first composed the archetype. At the same time, we knew that the Shaykh continually revised and expanded his printed book “As-Ṣifah,” edition after edition, so significant differences were bound to exist that had to be incorporated into this “Original.”

This convinced us that we were not producing a mere heritage text; our sole purpose was to issue a rigorously academic, juristic work from which readers and researchers might benefit—and through which they might benefit others—reassured that it reflects the Shaykh’s final, considered position.

By Allah’s favor we were enabled to follow a meticulous method that, on the one hand, preserves the original exactly as it is, and, on the other, completes it—both in knowledge and in jurisprudence.