“And because this is the consensus of the Muslims: in no age do we know of anyone who abandoned the prayer whose ritual washing and funeral prayer were omitted, who was barred from inheriting from his deceased relative, or whose marriage was dissolved because either spouse had abandoned the prayer—despite the great number of those who abandon it. Had he been a disbeliever, these rulings would have applied. Nor do we know of any disagreement among the Muslims that one who abandons the prayer is required to make it up, despite their disagreement concerning the apostate. (1)

“As for the aforementioned hadiths”—meaning, those cited as proof by those who declare him a disbeliever, such as the hadith, “Between a man and disbelief lies abandoning the prayer”—“they are intended as stern warnings and as a likening to the disbelievers, not in their literal sense; like his saying, peace and blessings be upon him: ‘Abusing a Muslim is sinful defiance, and fighting him is disbelief,’ and similar texts intended to intensify the warning.”

Our shaykh—meaning Muwaffaq al-Maqdisi—may Allah have mercy on him, said: “This is the sounder of the two views. And Allah knows best.”

I say: Shaykh Sulayman ibn Shaykh Abd Allah ibn Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, may Allah have mercy on him, cited this approvingly in his marginal notes on Ibn Qudamah’s al-Muqni‘ (1/95–96).

Although Imam al-Shawkani explicitly stated in al-Sayl al-Jarrar (1/292) that one who deliberately abandons the prayer is a disbeliever, deserves to be killed, and that the Imam of the Muslims is obliged to kill him, he explained in Nayl al-Awtar that he did not mean a form of disbelief that is unforgivable. After relating the scholars’ views and their differences, and mentioning some of their proofs (1/254–255), he said:

“The truth is that he is a disbeliever and is to be killed. As for his disbelief, the hadiths authentically establish that the Lawgiver called one who abandons the prayer by this name (!) and made the prayer the barrier between a man and the permissibility of applying this name to him; thus, abandoning it entails the permissibility of applying it.

“None of the objections raised by the earlier scholars poses any difficulty for us, for we say: It does not preclude that