If they become numerous, you will find the answer to them in the books of our scholars, either addressing the very same issue or one analogous to it.
I said: “Then you have admitted—necessarily so—that the door of independent legal reasoning remains open!”
He said: “How so?”
I said: “Because you admitted that the answer may concern something analogous to it, rather than the very same matter. Since that is the case, one must examine whether the issue that has arisen in this age is analogous to the one about which they gave a ruling. At that point, there is no avoiding the use of reasoned analysis and analogy, which is the fourth source of Islamic law. This is none other than independent legal reasoning, for one qualified to undertake it! How, then, can you claim that its door is closed?”
This reminds me of another conversation I had with one of the muftis in northern Syria. I asked him: “Is prayer aboard an airplane valid?”
He said: “Yes.”
I said: “Are you saying this by taqlīd (following an authority), or through independent legal reasoning?”
He said: “What do you mean?”
I said: “It is well known that one of your principles in issuing fatwas is that it is not permissible to issue a fatwa based on independent legal reasoning; rather, it must rely on a textual ruling from an imam. Is there, then, a textual ruling affirming the validity of prayer aboard an airplane?”
He said: “No.”
I said: “How, then, have you departed from this principle of yours and issued a fatwa without a textual ruling?”
He said: “By analogy.”
I said: “What is the original case on which you base the analogy?”
He said: “Prayer aboard a ship.”
I said: “That is reasonable, but by doing so you have contradicted both a foundational principle and a subsidiary ruling. As for the principle, it is what I mentioned earlier. As for the subsidiary ruling, al-Rāfiʿī stated in his commentary that if someone were to pray in a swing that was neither suspended from the ceiling nor supported by the ground, his prayer would be invalid.”
He said: “I am unaware of that.”
I said: “Then consult al-Rāfiʿī, so that you may learn that ‘above every possessor of knowledge is one more knowing.’ If you acknowledged that you were qualified to use analogy and undertake independent legal reasoning, and that you were permitted to do so—even if only within the limits of the madhhab—the result would be that prayer aboard an airplane is invalid, because it is precisely the situation in which al-Rāfiʿī’s hypothetical scenario would be realized.
“As for us, we hold that prayer aboard an airplane is undoubtedly valid. Even if the reason prayer aboard a ship is valid is that the ship is supported by water lying between it and the ground, an airplane is likewise supported by air lying between it and the ground. This is what initially seemed apparent to you when you conducted your own investigation. But when you learned of that subsidiary ruling in the madhhab, it prevented you from affirming the conclusion to which your investigation had led you!”