We said to you:
Our agreement with you is dialectical. Suppose that, in agreement with you, we have affirmed that an infinite succession of temporal events is impossible, while, contrary to you, we have also said (1) that something receptive (2) to a thing may be devoid both of it and of its opposite.
You say:
“If He were receptive to temporal events (3), their infinite succession would necessarily follow, yet you do not affirm that (4).”
We reply:
If these two premises are sound—although we do not accept what follows from them (5)—then it necessarily follows that we have erred in either one or the other. There is no more reason to locate our error in what we conceded to you than in that on which we disagreed with you. We may have erred in denying an infinite succession of temporal events, rather than in saying:
“That which is receptive to a thing may be devoid both of it and of its opposite.”
Thus, our error on one of the two issues would not prove that you are correct (6) on the other issue on which we disagreed with you.
The most that follows in this (7) matter is [that we would be] (8) inconsistent. Such inconsistency (9) encompasses us, you, and most of those who have discussed this issue and others like it. If we are inconsistent, it is better for us to return to a position [in which] we agree with reason and revelation (10) than to return to a position