And we (1) say to anyone who denies that such things subsist in Him: Do you deny this (2) because you deny that an attribute subsists in Him, as the Mu'tazila do? Or do you deny it because whatever has temporally originated things subsisting in it is never devoid of them, and on similar grounds advanced by the Kullābiyya?
If he adopts the first position, the discussion concerning the foundational issue of the attributes, and concerning speech subsisting in the speaker rather than being separate from him (3), suffices for this matter. If it is the second, we say to these people (4): Do you deem it possible for temporally originated things to come into being without a newly arising cause, or not? If you deem that possible—as is your position—it follows that one who (5) had been bringing about neither them nor their opposites (6) would bring about temporally originated things. If this is possible, [then why] should it not be possible for temporally originated things to subsist in one in whom they had not (7) subsisted, nor had their opposites?
It is well known that bringing them about is a greater matter than receiving them (8). Thus, if bringing them about without a newly arising cause is possible, so too is their subsistence in a locus (9).
If you say:
“Whatever is receptive to a thing is never devoid of it or its opposite.”
(10 We reply: This premise is denied, and you have no evidence for it 10)
(10), [Then, even if this is conceded, it is like the assertion of