al-Bukhārī, in his book The Creation of Human Acts, from the scholars without qualification] (1). It is also the position of groups among the Murji'a, the Shi'a, the Karrāmiyya, and others (2).

Then, among those who hold that His action subsists in Him, some say: His action is beginningless, whereas the thing acted upon comes later, just as His will is beginningless whereas the thing willed comes later. This is maintained by those adherents of Abū Hanīfa, Ahmad, and others who hold this position. [This is what al-Thaqafī and other members of the Kullābiyya stated when the dispute arose between them and Ibn Khuzayma] (3).

[Others among them say: Rather, its kind originated in time. This is maintained by those among the Shi'a, the Murji'a, and the Karrāmiyya who hold this position] (4).

Others say: His action occurs (5), by His will and power, one act after another, yet He has always been characterized by it. Thus, its individual instances are temporally originated, while its kind is beginningless. This is maintained by those leading authorities among the people of hadith who hold this position, as well as by others among the adherents of al-Shāfi'ī and Ahmad and the various other groups. [Among them are those who say: Rather, creation is temporally originated and subsists in the created thing, as Hishām ibn al-Hakam and others maintain. Others say: Rather, it subsists independently, in no substrate, as Abū al-Hudhayl al-'Allāf and others maintain. Still others affirm an endless series of meanings subsisting independently, as Ma'mar ibn Abbād (6) and others maintain] (7).