colored by a color he created in another, or possessed of a scent he created in another. The consistent implication of that position is that he may be conceived as willing by means of a will he brought into being in another, yet not as loving, pleased, wrathful, or displeased by means of pleasure, love, wrath, or displeasure that he created in another.

These negators describe Him by what does not subsist in Him: at times, by what He creates in another, such as speech and will; and at other times, by what subsists neither in Him nor in another, such as knowledge and power. This too is inconceivable] (1); thus (2), no one can be conceived as living except one in whom life subsists, nor as knowing except one in whom knowledge subsists. [Just as, by the agreement of all rational people, none can be conceived as] (3) moving except one in whom motion subsists, [the consistent implication of this is that none can be conceived as] (4) an agent except one in whom action subsists.

[The Asharīs—and those who agreed with them, such as Ibn Aqīl and others—have, however, conceded an agent in whom action does not subsist: one who is just though justice does not subsist in him, and a creator and provider in whom creation and provision do not subsist.

The Mutazilites used this as an argument against them, saying: “Just as it is possible for Him to be just, Creator, and Provider through justice, creation, and provision that do not subsist in Him, the same applies to His being Knowing, Powerful, and Speaking.”

The Salaf—may Allah be pleased with them—and the majority of Ahl al-Sunnah apply their principle consistently. For this reason, Imam Ahmad—may Allah be pleased with him—and others cited the Prophet’s words—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—as proof that Allah’s speech is uncreated: “I seek refuge in the perfect words of Allah Most High, which