that is neither inside the world nor outside it is farther from the truth under either supposition. This is the required conclusion.

It should then be said:

Either reason permits something that is neither a body nor in any direction to be seen, or it precludes this. If it permits it, there is nothing further to discuss. If it precludes it, then reason would all the more emphatically preclude affirming an existent that is neither inside the world nor outside it, and yet is living without life, knowing without knowledge, and powerful without power.

If (1) you say, “This denial is a judgment of the imaginative faculty,” it is said to you:

Denying that something visible can be seen without being in a direction is likewise a judgment of the imaginative faculty. This is the third response.

This may be explained as follows: [It should be said:] (2): In your view, the imaginative faculty judges falsely when it applies to matters imperceptible to the senses (3) the same judgments that it applies to perceptible matters.

It is therefore said (4): Either it is possible to see the Creator, exalted is He, or it is not (5). If it is possible, your position affirming an existent (6) imperceptible to the senses is invalidated. There then remains no (7) false imaginative judgment applying an invalid judgment to what is imperceptible to the senses (8), for you deny that the Creator can be seen even more emphatically than you deny that angels, jinn, and other such beings can be seen. Thus, if—