apprehends things (1) that are particular, then the propositions we are discussing are universal and general. Universal, general propositions belong to reason, not to sense perception or to the estimative faculty that follows sense perception. Sense perception apprehends only particular things, and the same is true of the estimative faculty [according to you] (2). The refutation of these people (3) has been set out at length elsewhere. The purpose here, however, is to show that the position of those others is closer to the truth than theirs.

It may therefore be said:

If we present to reason, on the one hand, the existence of an existent that is neither within the world nor outside it, and is neither distinct from it nor spatially coincident with it (4), and, on the other hand, the existence of an existent distinct from the world and above it, yet not a body (5), reason’s assent to the second will be stronger than its assent to the first. This is present in every person’s innate disposition. Thus, the acceptance (6) of the second is closer to the innate disposition, while its aversion to the first is greater. If your claim—which is further removed from the innate disposition—must nevertheless be accepted, then the claim of these people has an even greater right to be accepted. Consequently, you cannot prove the falsity (7) (8 of their position with any argument unless that argument demonstrates the falsity of your own position even more clearly 8) (8).

If you say:

[The existence of an existent above the world that is not a body cannot be conceived by reason.

It is said to you:

Just as] (9) the existence of an existent that is neither within the world nor outside it cannot be conceived by reason.