the four, as well as others, said:

“Every self-subsisting existent can be seen.”

The Karrāmiyya and others said the same, as I believe. This is the approach followed by Ibn al-Zāghūnī, one of Ahmad’s adherents.

As for al-Asharī, he claimed that every existent can be seen, and a group of the adherents of the four imams agreed with him in this, including Qādī Abū Yalā and others.

He then carried his reasoning through consistently, saying:

“Every existent may be apprehended by any of the five senses: hearing, sight, smell, taste, and touch.”

A group of his adherents agreed with him in this, including Qādī Abū Bakr, Abū al-Maālī, and al-Rāzī; so too did Qādī Abū Yalā and others.

Others disagreed with them and said:

“We do not affirm smell, taste, or touch in this regard.”

They denied that any of these could apprehend the Creator, whereas the first group allowed that the Creator could be apprehended by all five senses. Still others, among the people of hadith and elsewhere, affirmed what the revealed texts attest concerning touch, but not smell or taste. Likewise, among the Mutazila, some affirmed perception as a general category, such as the Basrans, while others denied it, such as the Baghdadis. The point here is that those who affirm the vision, even if they erred in some of their statements, are closer to the truth, both scripturally and rationally, than those who deny the vision] (1).

We therefore say (2): Some things can be seen and others cannot. The factor distinguishing the two cannot consist of privative matters, because vision is a positive reality [and only something existent can be seen; vision is therefore not privative] (3). It does not relate (4) to what is nonexistent, nor (5) can the condition for it be