a person could attain happiness only by obeying this figure, whose commands and prohibitions remain unknown to him, it would follow that(1) no one could find the path to salvation, happiness, and obedience to Allah. This is among the gravest instances of imposing obligations beyond human capacity, and yet they(2) are among those most emphatic in declaring such an imposition impossible.

And if(3) it is said, “Rather, he commands what the Imāmīs maintain,”

it is answered:

There is then no need for his existence or presence, for this is already known whether he is alive or dead, and whether he is present or absent. If what Allah has commanded His creation can be known without this Awaited Imam, then it is evident that there is no need for him; neither obedience to Allah and His Messenger(4), nor anyone’s salvation or happiness, depends upon him. It is therefore untenable to say that someone like this may be an imam, much less that his imamate is obligatory. This is clear to anyone who reflects upon it, but the Rāfidis are among the most ignorant of people.

The reason is that performing the obligations established by reason and revelation, and refraining from what reason and revelation deem reprehensible, either depends upon knowing what this Awaited One commands and forbids or it does not. If it does depend upon that, it necessarily entails imposing what is beyond human capacity and making the performance of obligations and avoidance of prohibitions contingent upon a condition beyond the capacity of people at large—indeed, beyond the capacity of every one of them. For there is no one on earth who can truthfully claim to have seen this Awaited One or heard him speak. If it does not depend upon that, then the obligations established by reason and revelation can be performed, and what reason and revelation deem reprehensible can be avoided, without this Awaited One. There is therefore no need for him, and neither his existence nor his presence is obligatory.