Furthermore, under this supposition (1), anything that transitions (2) from one state to another can only be an agent acting by choice, not a cause that necessitates by its very essence. This may be clarified (3) as follows: either it is possible for temporal events to have continued perpetually without a beginning, or they must have a beginning. If they must have a beginning, then the doctrine of those who maintain the pre-eternity of the world and assert that the motions (4) of the celestial spheres are pre-eternal is invalid.

Furthermore, if temporal events must have a beginning, it necessarily follows that the world came into being, since it contains temporal events (5). For either the world necessarily entails temporal events, or (6) they are incidental to it. If it necessarily entails them, then it is established that it is never devoid of them. Thus, if (7) they have a beginning, then it (8) (* necessarily has a beginning, since it is never devoid of temporal events and neither precedes them nor comes before them. If it is supposed (9) that all temporal events came into existence after no temporal event whatsoever had existed, then that which accompanies them and did not precede them must certainly have come into existence (10) after not having existed ) (11). If, however, temporal events (12) are incidental to the world (13), it follows that temporal events came into being without a cause. ( If it is possible for [all] (14) temporal events to come into being without a [newly arising] (15) cause, it is likewise possible for the world to come into being without a newly arising cause ) (16) (17). ( Thus, every argument purporting to establish its pre-eternity is invalid, and anyone who maintains its pre-eternity does so without any argument whatsoever *) (18).