possibly not be devoid of it, and could therefore be devoid (1) of temporal occurrences. Whatever could have the [evidence] (2) of temporal origination necessarily apply to it would itself be temporally originated, for the Lord Most High cannot be subject to evidence of temporal origination.”

Some of them then contented themselves with saying: “Whatever is not devoid of temporal occurrences is temporally originated, for whatever is not devoid of them does not precede them (3 and therefore is not before them 3) (3). Whatever exists only concurrently with a temporal occurrence, and not before it, can only be temporally originated.”

Many authored works contain nothing beyond this. The most astute among them, however, recognized the distinction between a particular (4) temporal occurrence and the class of temporal occurrences. It is known that whatever does not precede a particular temporal occurrence is temporally originated. As for that which does not precede the class of temporal occurrences, its temporal origination cannot be established so long as (5) it has not been established that an everlasting succession of temporal occurrences is impossible, that they (6) have a beginning, and that an infinite succession of temporal occurrences—and the existence of temporal occurrences with no beginning—is impossible. The argument thus came to hinge upon the impossibility (7) of beginningless temporal occurrences.

This is the single most crucial point in this argument. There has been much (8) confusion over it, and error has become indistinguishable from what is correct.