of this body is not itself (1) the determinate magnitude of another particular body (2), even if it is equal to it. If one is greater than the other, the two have in common (3) the kind of magnitude, not that particular magnitude. Thus, what bodies share lies in these matters.
As for positing an externally existing thing that is present in one person and is numerically identical in another person, this is an obstinate denial of the obvious, whether the claim concerns matter or universal realities. These people, however, imagined that what exists in minds also exists in concrete entities. This matter is discussed at length elsewhere.
The point here is that this (4) category—composition and combination in the terminology of these philosophizing theologians and logicians and those who agree with them—[is] another type (5), distinct from those types. Every composite must be formed from something simple. Yet when their position is carefully examined, no simple meaning is found in their account from which these composites could be formed. Such a meaning exists only in minds, not in concrete entities. The simple, uncompounded element they posit (6)—such as absolute animality, absolute corporeality, and the like—has no external existence (7) except as specific attributes of specific subjects. These things therefore fall under the designations “composed” and “composite” according to stipulated terminological conventions, together with the conceptual considerations they involve.