of the object being divided need apply to each of them individually. Thus, if a slaughtered camel is divided among them, with one taking a thigh, another the head, and another the back, the designation “camel” does not apply to any of these parts. Likewise, if a tree is divided among them, with one taking half its trunk, another the other half, and a third its branches, the designation of the divided object does not apply to the individual parts. Similarly, if an arrow is divided among them—as the Companions used to divide such things—with one taking the shaft and another the arrowhead, neither this would be [an arrow] (1) nor that an arrow.

Thus, if the designation of the divided object applies only while its parts are assembled, (2 it ceases to apply when they are divided; but if it is used both while they are assembled 2) (2) and while they are separate—as when water, dates, and similar things are divided—it applies in both states. On either supposition, what is divided here consists of things (3) existing in the external world.

When we say, “Animals are divided into rational and brute animals,” we are not pointing to some particular animal existing in the external world and dividing it into two parts (4). Rather, this expression and meaning include whatever has existed and whatever has not [yet] (5) existed, and encompass particulars that have never occurred to the mind. These universal meanings, therefore, do not exist as universals in the external world.

Thus, when it is said that bodies share in the designation “body,” in a determinate magnitude (6), or in something else, that shared element is a universal meaning, whereas the determinate magnitude