[universal] (1), then he is plainly mistaken, whether he claims that these universals are eternal and separate from concrete entities—as they relate from Plato (2), calling them the “Platonic Forms”—or claims that they exist only in conjunction with determinate particulars, or claims (3) that the absolute is a constituent part of the determinate—as they relate from Aristotle and his followers, such as Avicenna and others.

They say that a species is composed of its genus and differentia; [and that] a human being (4) is composed of “animal” and “rational,” and a horse of “animal” and “neighing.” If what is meant is that a human being bears both descriptions, that is true. Yet an attribute is not the cause of the existence (5) of the thing it qualifies, nor does it precede that thing, whether in sensory perception or rational thought. Nor can a self-subsisting substance be composed of two accidents.

If, however, he means that a human being who exists in external reality contains two self-subsisting substances—one being the animal and the other the rational—this is a brazen denial of reason and sensory perception.

If what is meant by this composition is the composition of the conceptual human being conceived (6) in the mind, rather than the one existing among concrete entities, then this is correct. Yet that human being is constituted according to whatever the mind composes it from: if the mind composes it of “animal” and “rational,” it is composed of those two; and if it composes it of “animal” and “neighing,” it is composed of those two. Thus, the claimant’s assertion that one of