Minhaj as-Sunnah - Ibn Taimiya - (2/182)

Minhaj as-SunnahIbn Taimiya

assist the former, just as, a fortiori, nothing can assist itself. Thus, the power by which one agent acts cannot derive from the power by which the other agent acts. Rather, it must either (1) be an inseparable concomitant of his essence—as is the power of Allah Most High—or derive from the power of another, as does the servant’s power. If two mutually assisting lords are posited (2), neither of whom can act until the other assists him, then neither would be able to act by means of a power inseparable from his own essence. Nor could his power derive from the other, because the other cannot make him capable until he himself is capable. Therefore, if neither possesses power from himself, neither could possess any power at all.

It has thus become clear that it is impossible for the world to have two lords. It has also become clear that it is impossible for the Necessary Existent to possess any perfection derived from another, and that it is impossible for anything else to affect the Necessary Existent. Glorified is He, He is entitled to the perfection beyond which there is no higher degree, and that perfection necessarily belongs to Him. For any perfection that constitutes perfection [for an existent] (3) must either be necessary for Him, impossible for Him, or possible for Him. If it is necessary for Him, then this is precisely what was to be established. If it is impossible for Him, it would follow that a perfection possible for a contingent existent is impossible for the Necessary Existent, in which case the contingent existent would be more perfect than the Necessary Existent.

[Return to the discussion of Allah’s being characterized by the attributes of speech]

Moreover, contingent beings possess actual perfections, and these come from the One who is necessary in Himself. The Originator of perfection, who bestows and creates it, has a greater claim to perfection. For perfection is either existence itself or the perfection of existence; and whoever originates an existent has a greater claim to be existent, for—

(1) N and M read: “Rather, it only occurs,” which is a textual corruption. (2) B reads: “that [there are] two mutually assisting [lords].” A and B read: “Two mutually assisting [lords] became evident.” The reading adopted in the text is from N. (3) N and M read: “for existence.”

مُعِينًا لِهَذَا، كَمَا لَا يَكُونُ الشَّيْءُ مُعِينًا لِنَفْسِهِ بِطَرِيقِ الْأَوْلَى، فَالْقُدْرَةُ الَّتِي بِهَا يَفْعَلُ الْفَاعِلُ لَا تَكُونُ حَاصِلَةً بِالْقُدْرَةِ الَّتِي يَفْعَلُ بِهَا الْفَاعِلُ الْآخَرُ، بَلْ إِمَّا أَنْ تَكُونَ (١) مِنْ لَوَازِمِ ذَاتِهِ، وَهِيَ قُدْرَةُ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى، أَوْ تَكُونَ حَاصِلَةً بِقُدْرَةِ غَيْرِهِ كَقُدْرَةِ الْعَبْدِ، فَإِذَا قُدِّرَ رَبَّانِ مُتَعَاوِنَانِ (٢) لَا يَفْعَلُ أَحَدُهُمَا حَتَّى يُعِينَهُ الْآخَرُ، لَمْ يَكُنْ أَحَدُهُمَا قَادِرًا عَلَى الْفِعْلِ بِقُدْرَةٍ لَازِمَةٍ لِذَاتِهِ، وَلَا يُمْكِنُ أَنْ تَكُونَ قُدْرَتُهُ حَاصِلَةً مِنَ الْآخَرِ ; لِأَنَّ الْآخَرَ لَا يَجْعَلُهُ قَادِرًا حَتَّى يَكُونَ هُوَ قَادِرًا، فَإِذَا لَمْ تَكُنْ قُدْرَةُ وَاحِدٍ مِنْهُمَا مِنْ نَفْسِهِ، لَمْ يَكُنْ لِأَحَدِهِمَا قُدْرَةٌ بِحَالٍ. فَتَبَيَّنَ امْتِنَاعُ كَوْنِ الْعَالَمِ لَهُ رَبَّانِ، وَتَبَيَّنَ امْتِنَاعُ كَوْنِ وَاجِبِ الْوُجُودِ لَهُ كَمَالٌ يَسْتَفِيدُهُ مِنْ غَيْرِهِ، وَتَبَيَّنَ امْتِنَاعُ أَنْ يُؤَثِّرَ فِي وَاجِبِ الْوُجُودِ غَيْرُهُ، وَهُوَ سُبْحَانَهُ مُسْتَحِقٌّ لِلْكَمَالِ الَّذِي لَا غَايَةَ فَوْقَهُ، وَذَلِكَ الْكَمَالُ لَازِمٌ لَهُ ; لِأَنَّ الْكَمَالَ الَّذِي يَكُونُ كَمَالًا [لِلْمَوْجُودِ] (٣) ، إِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ وَاجِبًا لَهُ، أَوْ مُمْتَنِعًا عَلَيْهِ، أَوْ جَائِزًا عَلَيْهِ، فَإِنْ كَانَ وَاجِبًا لَهُ فَهُوَ الْمَطْلُوبُ، وَإِنْ كَانَ مُمْتَنِعًا لَزِمَ أَنْ يَكُونَ الْكَمَالُ الَّذِي لِلْمَوْجُودِ مُمْكِنًا لِلْمُمْكِنِ مُمْتَنِعًا عَلَى الْوَاجِبِ، فَيَكُونُ الْمُمْكِنُ أَكْمَلَ مِنَ الْوَاجِبِ. [عود إلى الكلام على اتصاف الله بصفات الكلام] وَأَيْضًا، فَالْمُمَكِنَاتُ فِيهَا كَمَالَاتٌ مَوْجُودَةٌ، وَهِيَ مِنَ الْوَاجِبِ بِنَفْسِهِ، وَالْمُبْدِعُ لِلْكَمَالِ الْمُعْطِي لَهُ الْخَالِقُ لَهُ أَحَقُّ بِالْكَمَالِ؛ إِذِ الْكَمَالُ إِمَّا وُجُودٌ، وَإِمَّا كَمَالُ وُجُودٍ، وَمَنْ أَبْدَعَ الْمَوْجُودَ كَانَ أَحَقَّ بِأَنْ يَكُونَ مَوْجُودًا؛ إِذِ

(١) ن، م: بَلْ إِنَّمَا يَكُونُ، وَهُوَ تَحْرِيفٌ. (٢) ب: بِأَنَّ مُتَعَاوِنَيْنِ، أ، ب: بَانَ مُتَعَاوِنَانِ، وَالْمُثْبَتُ عَنْ (ن) . (٣) ن، م: لِلْوُجُودِ.