or to which another has given (1) one of the necessary concomitants of its existence, is not necessarily existent in itself.

Thus, the sphere that has been filled with many bodies without any choice on its part is dependent on that which filled it with those bodies. If being filled constitutes a perfection for it, its perfection exists only through that other, and it is therefore not necessarily existent in itself. If, however, this constitutes a deficiency in it, then another has deprived it of the perfection lost (2) through that deficiency. Its essence therefore cannot entail that perfection, for if it did, the essence would cease to exist when that perfection did. That perfection is integral to the completeness of its very self; so if part of its self is not necessarily existent, its self cannot be necessarily existent, as previously explained.

Furthermore, if it is said that the outermost sphere has no effect (3) on anything in the world, it necessarily follows that it does not move the spheres within it. Yet they are moved by its motion while also possessing a motion contrary to its own. A single sphere would thus contain a power necessitating two contrary motions. This is impossible, for two contraries cannot coexist. Moreover, if that which necessitates a thing also necessitated its contrary—which cannot coexist with it—it would be producing it while not producing [it] (4), 8 and if it willed it, [it would will it] (5) while not willing it. This combines [two contradictories] (6).

If, on the other hand, it has an effect in moving the spheres or in some other respect, then it is known that it does not act independently, for those spheres have motions peculiar to them without its moving them. Moreover, the effects that occur on the earth necessarily involve bodies