something: either something already present that one seeks to remove, or something that has not yet occurred and that one seeks to prevent. Whoever does not depend (1) upon another to procure anything or ward off anything cannot be in need in any respect. It is thus clear that it is wholly independent of all else.

Moreover, if it were assumed to depend upon another, there would be only two possibilities: either it depends upon that other for anything (2) among the necessary concomitants of its existence, or for something incidental to it.

The first is impossible. If it depended upon another for any of its necessary concomitants, it could exist only through that other, because that which has a necessary concomitant cannot exist without it. Thus, if it cannot exist without its necessary concomitant, and that concomitant cannot exist except through that other, then it could not exist [except through that other and would therefore not be existent in itself. Rather, if that other existed, it would exist, and if that other did not exist, neither would it. Then, if that other were not existent] (3) in itself and necessary in itself, it would depend upon an originating agent.

If that agent were the first entity, causal circularity would follow; and if it were something else, an infinite regress of causes would follow. Both are impossible by the agreement of rational people, as has been explained at length elsewhere.

If that other were necessary in itself and existent in itself (4), while the first were likewise (5), then each of them could exist only through the existence of the other. It is possible for each of two things to exist only together with the other when they have a cause distinct from both of them, as with correlatives such as fatherhood and sonship,