you are told (1):
“If by your statement, ‘They are other than Him,’ you mean that they are separate from Him, that is false (2). But if you mean that they are not identical with Him, you are told (3): If an attribute is not identical with the one characterized by it, what is objectionable about that?”
If you then say:
“He depends upon them,”
it is said:
“By ‘dependence,’ do you mean that He depends upon an agent to bring Him into being, or upon a substrate in which He inheres? Or do you mean that He necessarily entails them, so that He exists only while characterized by them?
(4 If you mean the former, this is false; but if you mean the latter, it is said: What is objectionable about that?
And if you say:
‘They depend upon Him’ 4) (4),
it is said:
“Do you mean that they depend upon an agent who originates them, or (5) upon a substrate in which they inhere?
As for the latter, what is objectionable about it? As for the former, it is false (6), for the possessor of an inseparable attribute is not its agent.
And if you say:
‘He is its necessitating cause, its cause, or the ground requiring it,’
then if the attribute is necessary, what is necessary cannot be an effect; moreover, this would entail a plurality of necessary entities—namely, the attribute and the one characterized by it. But if it is possible in itself, what is possible in itself does not exist