the terminological conventions employed.
Likewise, the term “other” may refer to whatever is separate from (1) a thing. Thus, according to this terminology, a thing’s attribute and part are not other than it. This is the predominant usage among the Kullābiyya and Ashariyya, many hadith scholars and Sufis, jurists who follow the four Imams, and many of the Shia.
They may also say: “Two things are other than one another if either may be separate from the other (2) in time, place, or existence.” The term “other” (3) may also refer to whatever is not identical with the other. This is the predominant usage among the Mutazila and Karrāmiyya, as well as those Shia and philosophers who agree with them.
Likewise, the term “dependence” may mean [necessary concomitance] (4); it may mean an effect’s dependence upon its efficient cause; or it may mean its dependence upon its substrate and receptive cause (5).
This is the terminology of the philosophers, who divide causes into:
(* efficient, final, material, and formal causes; and they say: Matter—which is receptive—and form are the two causes of quiddity *) (6), while the agent and the end are the two causes of the existence of the reality in question. Other rational thinkers, however, do not call the receptive substrate a cause.
[Discussion of the Argument Used by These Philosophers and Those Who Agreed with Them to Deny the Attributes]
Thus, the argument used by these philosophers and those who agree with them to deny the attributes is composed of ambiguous terms.
Hence, when they say:
“If He were characterized by knowledge, power, and other such attributes