the source of that effect, whether it be this one or the other; rather, the effect would be something (1) separate from them both.
The precise explanation is that a thing’s perfection belongs to the thing itself and is intrinsic to it. Thus, that which is necessary in and of itself cannot be necessary unless whatever is intrinsic (2) to its essence is itself necessary in existence, without depending in that respect upon a cause external to it. Whenever it depends, with respect to something intrinsic to it, upon a cause external to it, its essence is not necessary in and of itself. Anything not intrinsic to its essence cannot be one of its perfections either; rather, it is something distinct from it. This would simply amount to two things: one necessary in and of itself, and another conjoined with it and annexed to it.
Moreover, the Necessary Existent Himself is the most perfect of all beings, since a necessary being is necessarily more perfect than a contingent one. Thus, with respect to every perfection possible for Him:
If it necessarily belongs to Him, then His perfection cannot be derived from another, nor (3) can He depend upon another for it.
If it does not necessarily belong to Him, then, if He were incapable of possessing it while another contingent being could possess it, the contingent being would be more perfect than the Necessary Existent. Anything that [neither] (4) a necessary being nor a contingent being can possess is not a perfection. If, however, He could possess it but His essence did not entail (5) it, then another would be granting it to Him. Yet the one who grants a perfection has a greater claim to that perfection and would therefore be more perfect than He, whereas none can be more perfect than the Necessary Existent.
And if it is said:
“That other is also a necessary being.”