of another for any aspect of his perfection, then his perfection would not exist in and of itself, but through that other. Without that perfection he would be deficient, and one who is deficient cannot be necessary in and of himself; rather, he is contingent and dependent upon another. For if he were necessary in and of himself despite being deficient and dependent upon another for some perfection, then, as for the one who grants him that perfection: if he were contingent, he would depend upon another necessary being, and the same reasoning would apply to him as to the first; if he were necessary but deficient, the same reasoning would again apply to him as to the first; and if he were necessary and perfect, then he would be the one truly necessary in and of himself. The being posited as necessary but deficient would depend upon this one for his perfection, while the latter (1) would have no need of him. The latter would thus be his lord, and he would be the latter’s servant. Since one who is subject to a lord and held in servitude cannot be necessary, the supposition of a deficient necessary being is impossible.

It is likewise impossible for the very being who is necessary in and of Himself to possess a deficiency whose removal depends upon another. Such a deficiency would then have to be capable of existing—otherwise He could not admit of it—and capable of not existing—otherwise it would necessarily adhere to Him and could not be removed. Yet the supposition is that it is possible (2) for it to be removed through the attainment of a perfection that is capable of existing, for that which is impossible cannot constitute a perfection.

As for that which is possible, it must either belong to the Necessary Existent or proceed from Him. It is impossible for a created being to be more perfect than the Creator. The Creator (3), who is necessary in and of Himself, is therefore more entitled to every perfection capable of existing that entails no deficiency. Yet His essence would not entail that perfection; consequently, if that perfection came to exist, it would depend both upon Him and upon that other being, arising through them both together. Each of the two would be necessary in and of itself, and therefore would not be—