any one of these matters, it must also be accepted in its analogue; otherwise, accepting it in one of two equivalent cases while rejecting it in the other is arbitrary.

These people have based their discourse on contradictory principles. According to them, estimation is a faculty of the soul that apprehends in sensible things what is not itself sensible. Like sense and imagination, this estimative faculty apprehends only particular meanings, not universals; universal judgments, by contrast, belong to reason. Thus, the judgment of innate disposition that any two existing things must either occupy the same locus (1) or be separate; that whatever is neither within the world nor outside it can only be nonexistent; that the existence of anything of that description is impossible; and other such judgments are universal rational judgments. They are not particular, individual judgments concerning a specific body such that they could be said to belong to estimation.

They also say:

“[Indeed,] (2) the judgment of estimation concerning what is not sensible is false, because estimation apprehends only those meanings present in sensible things that are not themselves sensible”—that is, they cannot be perceived by the senses.

It is well known that whether the Lord of the worlds can or cannot be seen is a well-known issue. [The early generations of the Muslim community] (3), its leading scholars, the majority of its speculative thinkers, and its general populace hold that Allah can be seen, as can the angels, the jinn, and all other things that subsist in themselves. Thus, if someone claims that neither He nor the angels (4)—which he himself (5) calls “immaterial entities,”