And it is as though he (1) deemed the well-known argument cited by [his predecessor] and his Mu'tazilite teachers (2) sufficient: if He were a body, He could not be devoid of motion and rest; and whatever cannot be devoid (3) of originated events is itself originated, for beginningless originated events are impossible.
They then say:
“If knowledge, power, life, speech (5), and other such attributes [were to] subsist in Him (4), He would be a body.”
There are two answers to this argument (6). The first is to say [to him that He], in your view (7), is living, knowing, and powerful, yet is not a body—even though you know of no living, knowing, and powerful being (8) except a body. Thus, if your position (9) is correct, it is possible for Him to possess life, knowledge, and power and to be distinct from the world and above it without being a body.
If you say:
“I cannot conceive of anything distinct and above except as a body,”
it is said to you:
“Nor can one conceive of anything living, knowing, and powerful except as a body. Therefore, if something that is not a body can be called (10) by these names, then something that is not a body can possess these attributes; otherwise, it cannot, because the name (11) necessarily entails the attribute.”