Likewise, if it is said:

“It is described as necessary
(1 just as its bearer is described as necessary 1)”
(1),

what is meant is not that it (2) is independently described as possessing necessity, beginninglessness, or temporal origination (3), for an attribute does not subsist by itself or exist independently in its own right. Rather, what is meant is that it (4) is beginningless and necessary by virtue of the beginninglessness and necessity of its bearer—if “necessary” is understood to mean that which has no agent, and “beginningless” (5) to mean that which has no beginning. This is true and entails no objection.

[This matter has been treated fully and at length in several places, where the ambiguity inherent in the expressions “Necessary Existent” and “beginningless,” as well as the specious argument of those who deny the attributes, have been explained. Here, however, he has mentioned it only briefly, and we have stated what is appropriate to this context.

We have also explained elsewhere that the expressions “beginningless” and “Necessary Existent” are ambiguous. If “beginningless” is intended to mean that which subsists by itself, the beginningless agent, the beginningless Lord, or the like, then the attribute is not beginningless in this sense; rather, it is an attribute of the Beginningless One. But if it is intended to mean that which has no beginning and was never preceded by nonexistence, then the attribute is beginningless.

Likewise, if “Necessary Existent” is intended to mean the self-subsisting being that exists by itself, then the attribute is not itself necessarily existent; rather, it is an attribute of the Necessary Existent. If it is intended to mean that which has no agent or efficient cause, then the attribute is necessarily existent. But if it is intended to mean that which has no relation to anything else, then nothing in existence is necessarily existent in this sense, for—