And if the attribute of a prophet who came into being] (1) agreed (2) with him in having come into being, it would not follow that it too must be a prophet like him. Likewise, if an attribute inseparable from the Lord is beginningless by virtue of His beginninglessness, it does not follow that it too must be a god like Him.

The position of these people (3) is to deny the attributes of perfection (4) that are inseparable from His essence. Their specious argument, to which he alluded (5), is that if those attributes were beginningless, there would be more than one beginningless being, as Ibn Sīnā and others like him maintain.

Ibn Sīnā and other philosophers adopted this from the Mutazila, saying (6): “If He had a necessarily existent attribute (7), there would be more than one necessary existent.” This is sophistry. If they mean that there would be more than one beginningless God or necessarily existent God, the alleged implication (8) is invalid. An attribute of God need not itself be a god, an attribute of a human being need not itself be a human being, an attribute of a prophet need not itself be a prophet, [and an attribute of an animal need not itself be an animal] (9).

If, however, they mean that the attribute is described as beginningless (* just as its bearer is described as beginningless, this is like the statement (10) of someone who says: “The attribute of a temporally originated being is described as temporally originated” *) (11), just as its bearer is described as temporally originated.