For sound reason dictates that when an attribute subsists in a subject, its ruling applies to that subject and not to anything else. Thus, the subject in which motion, blackness, or whiteness subsists is itself moving, black, or white, rather than anything else. Likewise, that in which speech, will, love, hatred, and pleasure subsist is what is described as speaking, willing, loving, hating, and being pleased, to the exclusion of anything else. Whatever does not possess an attribute subsisting in it cannot be described by that attribute. Hence, whatever does not possess speech, will, motion, blackness, or action subsisting in it cannot be called speaking, willing, moving, [black](1), or acting. If there is no attribute by which something may be described, it cannot be given a name denoting that attribute.

Yet these people called Him Living, Knowing, and Powerful, even though, according to them, He possesses neither life, knowledge, nor power. They called Him One who wills and Speaker, although will and speech subsist in something other than Him. Likewise, whoever calls Him Creator and Agent while maintaining that neither creation nor action subsists in Him holds a position of the same kind as theirs.

The texts of the Book and the Sunnah establish that He is characterized by attributes subsisting in Him. Language also requires that the true applicability of a derivative term entail the true applicability of that from which it is derived. Thus, whenever an active participle or a qualitative adjective is truly applicable, the referent of its verbal noun must also obtain. When someone is called standing or sitting, this necessarily entails standing or sitting. Likewise, when someone is called an agent or creator, this necessarily entails action or creation. When someone is called a speaker or one who wills, this necessarily entails speech or will. Similarly, when someone is called living, knowing, or powerful, this necessarily entails life, knowledge, or power.

Whoever denies that actions subsist in Him and says, “If He were Creator by virtue of an act of creation, then, if that act were—”