[this designation denotes the Lord (1)—the Ever-Living, the All-Knowing, the All-Powerful. It is impossible for there to be one who is living yet has no life, knowing yet has no knowledge, or powerful yet has no power, just as this is impossible in analogous cases.
When someone says, “His attributes are additional to His essence,” what is meant is that they are additional to what the negators affirm—not that, in reality, there is an essence divested of attributes, together with attributes added to it. That is false.
Whoever claims that Ahl al-Sunnah affirm alongside Allah entities that are co-pre-eternal with Him, and that He depends upon those entities, has lied about them.
The speculative theologians hold four positions on this matter: affirming the attributes; affirming the states; denying both; and affirming the states but not the attributes (2).
(1) The passage from “this designation denotes the Lord” (p. 124) through “And if the attribute of the created prophet…” (p. [0–9]30) is absent from (N) and (M). I shall indicate where the omission ends when that point is reached, Allah willing.
(2) The proponent of the doctrine of states (*ahwāl*) was Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī (see his biographical notice above, 1:270 n. [0–9]). Al-Shahrastānī summarizes his doctrine of states in *al-Milal wa al-Nihal*, 1:76, as follows:
“According to Abū Hāshim, He is knowing by virtue of His essence, meaning that He ‘possesses a state’—a cognizable attribute distinct from His being an existent essence. The attribute is known only as pertaining to the essence, not independently. He thus affirmed ‘states,’ which are attributes that are neither existent nor nonexistent, and neither known nor unknown—that is, when considered in isolation they are not known as such, but only together with the essence.
“He said: Reason necessarily perceives a distinction between knowing a thing in itself and knowing it as possessing an attribute. Knowing an essence does not entail knowing that it is knowing, nor does knowing a substance entail knowing that it occupies space and is receptive to accidents. There is no doubt that a person apprehends that existent things agree in one respect and differ in another, and necessarily knows that the respect in which they agree is other than that by which they differ. No rational person denies these rational determinations. They reduce neither to the essence nor to accidents beyond the essence, for the latter would entail an accident subsisting in another accident. It therefore necessarily follows that they are ‘states.’ Thus, a knower’s being knowing is a ‘state’: an attribute distinct from its being an essence, meaning that its concept differs from the concept of the essence. The same applies to being powerful and living.”
He then affirmed of the Exalted Creator another “state” that necessitated those “states.”
On the “states,” see also: Ibn Tāhir al-Baghdādī, *Usūl al-Dīn*, p. [0–9]2; *al-Farq bayna al-Firaq*, p. [0–9]17; *al-Tabsīr fī al-Dīn*, pp. [0–9]3–54; al-Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat al-Iqdām*, pp. 131–149; Zuhdī Jār Allāh, *al-Mu'tazila*, pp. 69–70; Albert Nasrī Nādir, *Falsafat al-Mu'tazila*, 1:225–230; and the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, entries “al-Jubbā'ī” and “al-Hāl.”