and the ambiguous statement it expresses: whatever in its affirmation is true and accords with revelation or reason, they affirm; and whatever in its denial is true (1) according to revelation or reason, they deny. In their view, no conflict can be conceived between sound proofs that yield knowledge, whether revelational or rational.

The Book and the Sunnah sometimes indicate the truth by reporting it, sometimes by drawing attention to it, and sometimes by directing people to rational proofs and explaining them. The substance of the certain proofs and knowledge of divine matters possessed by those who engage in rational inquiry into theology is already set forth in the Book and the Sunnah, together with additions and completions to which none are guided except those whom Allah guides through His revelation. Thus, the rational proofs and certain knowledge contained in what the Messenger (2) brought surpass all that is found in the minds of every rational person among earlier and later generations.

This general point admits extensive elaboration. Some of it has already been expounded in various places, but the present context cannot accommodate a full treatment, for every occasion has its appropriate discourse.

However, when the Rāfida sought support from the Mu‘tazila and began censuring Ahl al-Sunnah with allegations they themselves had fabricated—whether deliberately or through ignorance—we mentioned here what was appropriate to the present context.

The point here is that Ahl al-Sunnah] (3) unanimously agree that there is nothing like Allah, whether in His Essence, His attributes, or His actions. However, the term “likening,” as used by these negationists who deny the divine attributes (4), is ambiguous. If by the term (5) “likening” they mean what is negated by