Then many people censure the first group on the grounds that it necessarily contradicts unequivocal reason and revelation, for it affirms that a visible object can be seen without being faced, and affirms speech belonging to a speaker who does not speak by his will and power.

Many of them also censure the second group on the grounds that it contradicts sound rational reasoning.

Nevertheless, most people maintain that the deniers who oppose both groups—namely, the Jahmiyya, the Mu‘tazila, and their Shi‘a followers—are in far greater conflict with clear reason—indeed, with what reason knows by necessity—than either of those two groups.

As for their opposition to the texts of the Book and the Sunnah and to what has been widely transmitted from the early generations of the Muslim community, it is too manifest and well known to escape the notice of any scholar. They therefore founded their religion on the principle that, in matters of divine oneness and the attributes, one must not follow what is indicated by the Book, the Sunnah, and consensus. Instead, one must follow the conclusions they reach by the standards of their own reason. As for the texts of the Book and the Sunnah, they either interpret them figuratively, consign them to Allah, or say:

“The Messenger intended to present the masses with a belief in imaginative form from which they would benefit in this world, even though it was a fabrication and falsehood.”

This is what some of the philosophers and their followers claim. The true implication of their position is that the messengers lied in what they reported concerning Allah, His angels, His Books, His messengers, and the Last Day, because they considered this beneficial to the masses in their worldly lives.

As for the third group, they state without qualification, in matters of denial and affirmation, whatever the Book and the Sunnah state. Where speculative thinkers dispute whether something should be denied or affirmed without holding fast to the Book and the Sunnah, this group does not agree with the religious innovations they have introduced and through which they have contradicted reason. Rather, they either refrain from speaking in innovated terms, whether in denial or affirmation, or draw the necessary distinctions concerning the expression—