(1) The text following the phrase “nor is the One possessing them a body” is disconnected. It is clear that manuscripts (A) and (B) contain a lacuna extending over several lines. I shall endeavor here to supply what may stand in place of the missing text, according to my understanding of Ibn Taymiyya’s intent and in a manner consistent with the context, drawing upon passages from various places in his works: However, the Kullābiyya, together with those Ashʿarites and members of the Sālimiyya who agreed with them, did not affirm the volitional attributes that depend upon His will and power, such as His speaking by His will, whenever He wills, with particular words. They maintained that whatever occurs by His will and power can only be something created, temporally originated, and separate from Him. If the Lord were characterized by it, temporal occurrences would subsist in Him; and if they subsisted in Him, He would never be devoid of them. Accordingly, they held that Allah speaks with eternal speech inseparable from His Essence from everlasting to everlasting, no part of which depends upon His will or choice. The same applies to the other volitional attributes, such as His loving, being pleased, hearing, and seeing. Thus, when He sees a thing after it has come into existence, He sees only something existing in His knowledge, not something existing separately from Him. The second group affirmed the volitional attributes and said that Allah speaks by His will and power with speech eternal in His Essence, and that He speaks in letters and sounds by His will and power. They did so to avoid the two innovations of the Muʿtazila and the Kullābiyya. Nevertheless, they maintained that it had not been possible for Him to speak from eternity; rather, speech became possible for Him after having been impossible, without any cause arising that made speech possible and enabled Him to speak. The well-known position of the Karrāmiyya is that He is never devoid of the temporal occurrences that subsist in Him, nor is He ever separated from them. For if temporal occurrences subsisted in Him and then ceased, He would be receptive to that and therefore could not have been devoid of it; and whatever is never devoid of temporal occurrences is itself temporally originated. For them, *hudūth* (coming to be) differs from *ihdāth* (being brought into being). In their view, the Quran is *hādith* (having come to be), but not *muhdath* (brought into being), because what is *muhdath* requires an act that brings it into being, unlike mere *hudūth*. We agree with the Karrāmiyya in their affirmation of the volitional attributes and in their statement that He speaks by His will and power with speech subsisting in His Essence. We disagree with them, however, concerning the premise upon which they based their claim that this had not been possible from eternity. Thus, when they say that it is impossible because temporal occurrences without a beginning are impossible, we do not concede that this is impossible.