not to anything else (1). Thus, when He creates motion in a locus, it is that locus which moves by means of it; the one moving by means of it is not its creator. Likewise, when He creates a color, scent, knowledge, or power in a locus, it is that locus which is colored by that color, scented with that scent, possessed of that knowledge, and capable by means of that power. Similarly, when He creates speech in a locus, that locus (2) is the one speaking those words, and that speech belongs to the locus, not to its creator. Consequently, if that speech were created, the words Moses heard—namely:

{“Indeed, I am Allah”}

[Surah Tā Hā: 14]

would be the speech of the tree, not the speech of Allah.

The Muʿtazila and their Shiʿa followers (3) argued for this by analogy with acts. They said:

“Just as He is just and beneficent by virtue of justice and beneficence that subsist in something other than Him, so too He speaks by means of speech that subsists in something other than Him.”

This argument held against those, such as al-Ashʿarī and others, who conceded to them the point concerning acts, for in his view no act subsists in Him. Rather, he says:

“The act of creation is identical with the created thing and is nothing other than it.”

This is also the position of a group among the followers of Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, and Ahmad, and it was the first of the two positions held by Judge Abū Yaʿlā.

The majority, however, say:

“The act of creation is distinct from the created thing.”

This is the Hanafi position, and it is what (4) al-Baghawī (5) \ 248. reported from Ahl al-Sunnah, as well as what was reported by (6)