exist by itself; thus, considered in itself, it is nonexistent, [and considered in itself, it is possible] (1). If an infinite number of such things were posited, the aggregate would not thereby become self-existent and necessarily existent. For adding one originator to another, one nonexistent thing to another, and one possible thing to another does not free it from dependence (2) upon an agent to bring it into being. Rather, their multiplication only increases the aggregate’s need for and dependence upon an agent. The dependence of two possible originators is greater than that of either one, just as the nonexistence of two is greater than the nonexistence of either one. Thus, an infinite regress and numerical multiplication in this respect do not free it from dependence and need; rather, they increase its need and dependence.

If an infinite number of originated things, nonexistent things, and possible things were posited—whether some were posited as effects of others or not—[none] (3) of them could exist except through an agent and maker outside this common nature, which necessarily entails dependence and need. Their agent, therefore, cannot be nonexistent, originated, or possible, admitting both existence and nonexistence. Rather, it can only be self-existent, necessarily existent, incapable of nonexistence, beginningless, and unoriginated. For anything that is not such depends upon someone to create it; otherwise, it would not exist.

As for an infinite regress among effects, such as one originated event occurring after another, there are the three positions mentioned above: either it is denied in both the past and the future, as held by Jahm and Abu al-Hudhayl; or it is denied only in the past, as held by many speculative theologians; or—