Those who take this view say:
An infinite aggregate is impossible only when all its members coexist in actual existence, whether its parts (2) (3 are continuous, as bodies are, or are 3) (3) separate, as human souls are (4). They also say: Everything that coexists in actual existence must be finite.
Others say: What must be finite is an aggregate whose members are interrelated, such that it possesses either a positional order, as bodies do, or a natural order (5), as causes do. But where the members are not interrelated, as with souls, this need not apply to them. These, then, are two views.
As for those who hold that an infinite series is impossible even if its members cease to exist after having existed, some apply this to both the past and the future, as was the view of Jahm (6) and Abū al-Hudhayl. Others distinguish between the past and the future. This is the view of many theologians and those who agreed with them.
They said: “If (7) you were to say, ‘Whenever I give you a dirham, I will give you (8) another after it,’ this would be possible. But if you were to say, ‘I will not give you a dirham until I have given you one before it,’ this would be impossible.” Abū al-Maʿālī relied on this (9) in his Irshād (10), as did others like him