But when what is predicated of the individual members is not an attribute of the aggregate, it does not follow that what holds true of the aggregate is the same as what holds true of the individual members. Take, for example, the constituent parts of a house, a human being, [and a tree] (1): none of these parts is itself a house or a human being [or a tree] (2). Likewise, the parts of a long, broad, lasting, or extended whole need not themselves be, respectively, long, broad, lasting, or extended (3).
Similarly, if each successive individual is subject to perishing or temporal origination, it does not follow that the kind comes to an end or is temporally originated (4) after not existing. Its temporal origination means that it came to exist after not existing, just as its perishing means that it became nonexistent after having existed. Its becoming nonexistent after having existed, or coming to exist after having been nonexistent, is a matter (5) pertaining to its existence and nonexistence, not to the very nature inherent in the aggregate—as is the case when the individual members are existent (6), nonexistent, or possible. Thus, the fact that this particular individual (7) does not last does not entail that its kind (8) does not last, for continuity consists in the succession of individual members. This is a property exclusive to the aggregate and is not predicated of any one individual. And when, through aggregation, the aggregate acquires a property