at all. [Rather] (1), everything said to be a cause is either such that its causal efficacy depends upon something else—in which case it is not complete—or it is [not] (2) distinct from its effect, as in the view of those who affirm states and maintain that knowledge is the cause of the state of being knowing. Otherwise, most people hold that knowledge is itself the state of being knowing.

As for saying that the essence necessitates the attributes or is their cause, it (3) does not truly perform any act or exert any causal influence at all. But if something is posited as acting upon another, while the two are posited as coexistent (4) and equal, with neither temporally preceding the other, this is utterly inconceivable.

Furthermore, being prior to everything else in every respect is an attribute of perfection, for that which is prior to another in every respect is more perfect than one that is prior (5) in one respect but not another.

If it is said, “Action, or the positing of action—or something else, such as motion or time—cannot have a beginning,” the reply is: If this is false, the objection falls away; and if it is true, all that is affirmed is the perfection whose existence is possible.

Accordingly, if the genus is perpetual, what is possible and more perfect (6) is His being prior to every individual instance, such that nothing among the parts of the world coexists with Him (7) in any