himself and others; likewise, whoever holds it to be forbidden holds it to be forbidden for himself and others. Thus, someone who disputes such a ruling is not suspected of bias. For this reason, a man’s narration of a hadith from the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—is accepted in a dispute even if he is a party to it. The hadith has general application, encompassing that case and others. If a ruling based on the hadith favors its narrator today, tomorrow a ruling based on it will go against him. This differs from his testimony on his own behalf, which is not accepted, because he is a litigant, and a litigant cannot serve as a witness.

Consensus on the political leadership of a particular individual is therefore not a ruling on a general, universal matter; rather, it is comparable to rulings concerning a specific, particular matter.

Moreover, when an individual opposes a known scriptural text, his dissent is anomalous. An example is Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyab’s dissenting view that a woman divorced three times becomes lawful for her first husband merely by contracting a marriage with another husband. Since the authentic Sunnah contradicted this view, it was not taken into account.

Saʿd wanted them to appoint a man from the Ansār. Yet numerous texts transmitted from the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—indicate “that the ruler is to be from Quraysh.” Had the dissenter been from Quraysh and persisted in his dissent, this would have provided grounds for doubt. Indeed, Alī was from Quraysh, and mass-transmitted reports establish that he pledged allegiance to al-Siddīq willingly and of his own free choice.

Second: Even supposing that those he mentioned had dissented, together with twice as many others, this would not undermine the establishment of the caliphate. The caliphate requires only the agreement of those who wield power and the majority whose support sustains authority, such that the purposes of political leadership can be fulfilled through them.