to Abū Bakr:

“Let us meet this afternoon for the pledge of allegiance.”

After Abū Bakr had offered the noon prayer, he ascended the pulpit and pronounced the testimony of faith. He spoke about Alī, his delay in pledging allegiance, and the explanation he had given, then sought Allah’s forgiveness. Alī then pronounced the testimony of faith and acknowledged Abū Bakr’s rightful standing. He explained that neither envy of Abū Bakr nor denial of the distinction Allah had granted him had prompted his conduct:

“But we believed that we had a share in this matter, and he assumed authority to our exclusion, so we felt hurt.”

The Muslims were pleased with this and said, “You have done right.” They felt warmly towards Alī when he approached the matter in a proper manner.

There is no doubt that the consensus recognized as valid in matters of political leadership is not undermined when one or two people, or a small group, withhold their allegiance. If their agreement were required, consensus on political leadership would scarcely ever be reached. Political leadership concerns a particular appointment, and a man may withhold his allegiance because of a personal desire unknown to others. Such was Saʿd’s abstention: he had aspired to become a ruler from among the Ansār (Helpers), but this did not come about, so there remained (1) in his heart a trace of that desire.

When someone abstains from something out of personal desire, his abstention has no effect. This differs from consensus on general rulings, such as declaring something obligatory, forbidden, or permissible. If one or two scholars dissent concerning such a ruling, does their dissent count? Scholars hold two opinions on this.

Two positions have been reported from Ahmad on this question. According to the first, the dissent of one or two scholars does not count. This is the view of a group of scholars, including Muhammad ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī. According to the second, the dissent of one or two scholars does count in matters of legal rulings. This is the view of the majority.

The distinction between legal rulings and political leadership is that a ruling is general and applies to one person as well as another. Thus, whoever holds something to be obligatory holds it to be incumbent upon