and so the true implication of their position was that none of the events in the upper and lower worlds has any agent whatsoever to bring it into being; nor is there any agent for that which necessarily entails these events (1) [and the elements] (2), even though every part of the world necessarily entails events (3).
It is known from the first principles (4) of reason that the existence of a contingent being dependent on another is impossible (5) without a Necessary Existent, and that events cannot exist without an originator. Their later thinkers—such as Ibn Sīnā and his peers—concede (6) that the entire world is contingent [in itself] (7), not necessary in itself. Whoever among their extremists disputes this holds a position whose falsity is known in many ways, for dependence and need are inherent (8) in every part of the world. No part of it (9) subsists except through something distinct from it.
The Necessary Existent is, by Himself, independent of it (10) and does not depend on anything else in any respect. Nothing in the world [itself] (11), acting alone, brings any event into being. Each celestial sphere has a motion peculiar to it, and its motion does not arise from the motion of—