travel to a particular city, such as Mecca. This is a universal volition [following a universal conception] (1). There must then arise in him successive conceptions of the distances he traverses and volitions to traverse those distances. Such, according to them, is the motion (2) of the celestial sphere. Yet its universal object of volition is to become like (3) the First. Hence they said:
“Philosophy is becoming like the First to the extent possible.” (4)
If (5) this is their position, then it is evident that a final cause external to the effect cannot itself be the efficient cause. If the celestial sphere is contingent and moves by its own will and choice, it must have an originator [of its own] (6) who brought it wholly into being—with its essence, attributes, and actions—just as in the case of the human being. These newly occurring conceptions, volitions, and motions must ultimately lead back to one who is beginningless and necessary in Himself, from whom they proceed, whether they are said to proceed through an intermediary or without one.
Yet these men affirmed none of this. Rather, they affirmed only a final cause of motion,